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A population can be immune to epidemics even if not all of its individual members are immune
to the disease, just as long as sufficiently many are immune—this is the traditional notion of herd
immunity. In the smartphone era a population can be immune to epidemics even if not a single
one of its members is immune to the disease—a notion we propose to call “digital herd immu-
nity”, which is similarly an emergent characteristic of the population. This immunity arises because
contact-tracing protocols based on smartphone capabilities can lead to highly efficient quarantining
of infected population members and thus the extinguishing of nascent epidemics. When the disease
characteristics are favorable and smartphone usage is high enough, the population is in this immune
phase. As usage decreases there is a novel “contact tracing” phase transition to an epidemic phase.
We present and study a simple branching-process model for COVID-19 and show that digital im-
munity is possible regardless of the proportion of non-symptomatic transmission. We believe this is
a promising strategy for dealing with COVID-19 in many countries such as India, whose challenges
of scale motivated us to undertake this study in the first place and whose case we discuss briefly.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent events have challenged the public health in-
frastructure worldwide for controlling the spread of con-
tagious diseases. This difficulty is partly due to the
novel pathogen involved and partly due to some un-
usual characteristics of COVID-19 [1], which pose unique
obstacles to developing a systematic public health re-
sponse. Specifically, the infection appears to be trans-
mitted through a large number of asymptomatic and pre-
symptomatic cases and the fraction of such transmission
is large enough to lead to an epidemic on its own, even if
all symptomatic cases were immediately isolated [1, 2].
This leaves two approaches to controlling an exponen-
tial growth in the number of infected people. The first
is continuous monitoring of entire populations via reg-
ular testing, which can identify new infections already
during their latent phase and thus end non-symptomatic
transmission. The second is the established method of
“contact tracing” [3], in which people who have been ex-
posed to newly identified infected people are isolated be-
fore they have a chance to infect others. In principle,
either approach is capable of ending the epidemic.
Population-level testing is not possible today, but per-
haps with major advances in pooled testing this may
be possible not too long from now, at least for popu-
lations in countries with the requisite health care infras-
tructure. Traditional contact tracing, done by teams of
health officials relying on interviews with newly identi-
fied cases, is also not up to the task today, as it fails
if non-symptomatic transmission is too frequent [3, 4].
Fortunately, we live in the smartphone era, and it has
been noted that using these devices to record contacts
can make the task of tracing them entirely solvable by
automating it. This idea has been spelled out in a series
of papers [5, 6] and is the basis for a rapidly expanding
set of contact-tracing apps and the recent announcement
by the Apple-Google duopoly of their intention to build
the technology into their operating systems [7]. We note
that the possibility of using mobile networks to study
disease dynamics has been explored in the past [8–10].
In this paper we contribute to this emerging field
of infectious disease control along two axes. First, we
present a simple model of the early stages of the spread
of COVID-19, which allows us to obtain estimates, as a
function of a varying amount of non-symptomatic trans-
mission, of the fraction of the population that needs to
participate in a digital contact sharing network in order
to prevent new epidemics. Our interest in this question
was seeded by the very practical question of whether
a country like India can use this technology to achieve
epidemic control today. Indeed, India is now launched
on this enterprise [11]. While somewhat more complex
modeling with various differences from our own became
available while we were working on this problem [5, 12],
we feel that our approach has the virtue of making the
existence and values of the estimated compliance thresh-
olds transparent. Our estimates for the fraction of the
population that needs to own a contact-tracing app to
avert a COVID-19 epidemic range from 75%− 95%, de-
pending on the fraction of asymptomatic transmission,
θ = 20% − 50%, that takes place. Busy epidemiologists
and health officials will find this part of interest.
Our second contribution is to frame the overall dis-
cussion in a language more familiar to physicists and
students of complex phenomena more generally—that of
phases, phase transitions and emergent properties. The
bottom line here is the idea that the immunity of a pop-
ulation to epidemic growth is an emergent, or collective,
property of the population. For traditional vaccination
or epidemic-induced “herd immunity”, this feature gets
conflated with the fact that individuals can be immune
to the disease at issue. But mass digital contact tracing
now makes it possible for the population to be immune
to epidemic growth even as no individual has immunity
to the underlying disease. We propose to refer to this
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as the existence of a “digital herd immunity”. This fits
well into the general idea of an emergent property, which
does not exist at the level of the microscopic constituents
but exists for the collective [13, 14]. We would be remiss
if we did not note that epidemiologists have previously
referred to this state of affairs as “herd protection” and
“sustained epidemic control” [5]. Our intention with the
proposed terminology is both to frame a public health
goal by including the word digital and to emphasize the
emergent nature of a herd immunity.
In the balance of this paper we do the following.
We begin by summarizing the case for contact trac-
ing as an effective strategy for combating COVID-19.
We then introduce a simple branching-process model for
the spread of this disease, that incorporates the key
features necessary to assess the efficacy of a digital,
app-based approach, namely asymptomatic transmis-
sion, pre-symptomatic transmission and recursive con-
tact tracing. We find in general that there is a critical
fraction 0 ≤ φc < 1 of app ownership, such that take-
up of contact-tracing apps by a fraction φ > φc of the
population is sufficient to prevent epidemic spread. We
provide an analytical, “self-consistent mean-field” esti-
mate for this threshold, which is verified against detailed
numerical simulations. In the final discussion, we address
the applicability of our results to the specific context of
India.
II. A MODEL FOR APP-BASED CONTACT
TRACING
A. Motivation and relevance to COVID-19
Traditional contact tracing is a multi-stage process.
First, one identifies symptomatic, infected individuals.
Next, one finds the people they came into close contact
with during their infectious period. Finally, one treats
or isolates these people before they can go on to infect
others. Manual contact tracing becomes difficult for in-
fections that have a period before the onset of symp-
toms when an exposed person is contagious (the Ω pe-
riod). Further delay in finding the symptomatic person
and their contacts could lead to tertiary infections, mak-
ing it difficult to control an outbreak. For COVID-19,
the incubation period is thought to be around 5-6 days,
while the Ω period is estimated to be 1-3 days [2]. The
time before becoming contagious, or the latent period L,
is around 4 days. Stochasticity of these times aside, it is
reasonable to expect that if Ω < L on average, and if the
exposed contacts of an individual can be traced before
they become infectious, then an epidemic could be pre-
vented. However, the delays typical for manual contact
tracing, even just one or two days, can render contact
tracing completely ineffective for COVID-19, given the
typical L and Ω periods; this conclusion is supported by
detailed numerical simulations [5, 12].
This is where digital contact tracing comes in. A
smartphone application could enable instant isolation of
an infected person and their network of contacts. This
halts the transmission chain, because infected contacts
cannot infect others during their latent period. The ques-
tion immediately arises of how widespread such tracing
needs to be in order to prevent an epidemic, and this
question is the focus of our paper. Below we present a
simple model that captures the essential features of dis-
ease spread necessary to tackle this problem.
To place our work in context, the classic quantitative
analyses of the efficacy of contact tracing [3, 4], from be-
fore the smartphone era, showed that traditional, manual
contact-tracing protocols become useless when the rate
of non-symptomatic spreading, θ, is too high. By con-
trast, app-based approaches allow for “recursive” contact
tracing, whereby contacts of contacts can be traced to an
arbitrary recursive depth, at no additional cost. The ef-
fectiveness of recursive contact tracing has been studied
in previous work; mathematically rigorous results exist
for purely symptomatic transmission [15, 16] and detailed
numerical simulations have been performed that take
non-symptomatic transmission into account [17]. Some
recent works have provided quantitative estimates for the
effectiveness of contact-tracing, both non-recursive and
recursive, in the specific context of COVID-19 [5, 6, 12].
Our results should be viewed as complementary to these
studies. One comparative advantage of the model that we
propose is its simplicity; in particular, it provides a nat-
ural starting point for understanding the universal prop-
erties of the contact-tracing phase transition.
B. A branching-process model
Suppose we have an epidemic spreading through an
infinite population of susceptibles, in discrete time, and
infecting a number R of the population at each time step
(here, R is an “effective reproduction number” that de-
pends on the detailed properties of the epidemic spread,
including the basic reproduction number R0). This is a
generic model for a spreading epidemic at short times.




1−R R < 1
∞ R ≥ 1,
(1)
and if R < 1, the epidemic has been controlled.
We want to understand which R best captures the
effect of mobile-phone-based contact tracing. From a
statistical physics perspective, R is the single relevant
parameter controlling the epidemic spread, and the key
question is which “microscopic” degrees of freedom must
be included to obtain a realistic estimate for R.
To this end, we consider three parameters which im-
plicitly determine R : the fraction of the population that
will present asymptomatic cases (θ), the fraction of the
population using a contact tracing application (φ), and
the basic reproduction number for an individual who
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FIG. 1. An illustrative realization of our branching-process
model. a) An in-network asymptomatic person (CA) infects
R0 = 3 people, whose category of infection is chosen indepen-
dently and uniformly subject to parameters θ, the fraction
of the population that presents asymptomatic cases, and φ,
the fraction of the population using a contact-tracing app. b)
A CS infection triggers an alert on the contact network, but
the CS person and everybody else in their generation is still
able to infect people before the contact network is triggered
(while we depict RS = 2, we also simulate more realistic val-
ues RS = 0, 1). The arrows show the alerts sent to everyone
connected to the CS individual by the contact network. c)
Once the alert is sent out, everybody in the contact-network-
connected component of the CS individual can be quarantined
immediately (thick circles) without giving rise to further dis-
ease spread, since they are in the latent (non-contagious) peri-
ods of their infections. Everyone outside the contact network
continue to infect people as usual. The “recursive” aspect of
such contact tracing corresponds to the arrow going back in
time in Fig. (1b); the middle branch of infections would be
missed by a traditional, non-recursive approach.
eventually shows symptoms (RS). RS is a combined mea-
sure of the number of pre-symptomatic infections and the
efficacy of quarantine: in the limit of perfect isolation
after showing symptoms, RS is precisely the number of
people that a symptomatic individual infects during their
Ω period, as defined above. We assume that RS is inde-
pendent of whether a symptomatic individual is on the
contact-tracing network or not.
The effects of these parameters on the growth of the
epidemic (or R) are studied using a simple branching-
process model, where all infectious individuals are either
symptomatic (S) or asymptomatic (A), and either on the
app-based contact tracing network (C) or not (N). In an
an uncontrolled setting, all types of infectious cases are
assumed to proliferate with R0 = 3, which is a reasonable
estimate [18] for COVID-191. Suppose that the outbreak
starts from a single infected individual at time t = 0. In
our discrete time (generational) model, this person in-
fects R0 other people at time t = 1, and each new infec-
tion is allotted one of the categories {CA,CS,NA,NS}
randomly, with probabilities that are determined by the
values of θ and φ. Individuals infected at the beginning
of each generation are assumed not to infect anyone else
after that generation has elapsed. Whenever a symp-
tomatic person on the contact network (CS) is encoun-
tered during this branching process, the contact network
is triggered, and all people connected by the network
through past and present infections are placed in quar-
antine. As discussed earlier, since pre-symptomatic in-
fections are common for COVID-19, our model includes
the possibility that a CS person infects RS people by
the time they trigger the contact network. As a conse-
quence, non-CS people in the same generation also infect
the next generation before the activation of the contact
network (see Fig. 1c). A few time-steps of the model
are illustrated explicitly in Fig. 1, together with the im-
plementation of recursive contact tracing via removing
connected components of the contact graph. Different
combinations of the parameters θ, φ and RS lead to an
effective reproduction number R distinct from the bare
reproduction number R0, and we expect epidemic growth
to be suppressed whenever R < 1.
Numerical simulations of this model were performed
on 10, 000 nodes with 100 initial infections; the results
are summarized in Fig. 2. The location of the phase
boundaries were verified to be independent of both dou-
bling the system size and doubling the number of sam-
ples averaged per point shown on the phase diagram, to
within the resolution of the phase diagram. Our numer-
ics are consistent with the hypothesis that for any given
fraction of asymptomatic transmission 0 ≤ θ < 1, and
any presymptomatic reproduction number 0 ≤ RS ≤ R0,
there is a critical point φc(θ), corresponding to the on-
set of “digital herd immunity”: epidemic control occurs
for a fraction of app owners φc(θ) < φ ≤ 1. For real-
istic COVID-19 parameter values, R0 = 3, RS = 1 and
θ = 0.2 − 0.5 [5, 18], we find that φc(θ) = 75% − 95%,
illustrating that when both presymptomatic and asymp-
tomatic transmission are taken into account, the rate of
app coverage necessary to prevent an epidemic can be
rather high. Some practical implications of this point
are raised in the final discussion.
1 There are also some higher estimates in the literature, e.g. based
on the early epidemic dynamics in Wuhan [19]. Given the greatly
increased state of awareness of the disease at this point it seems
reasonable to assume that such higher values are not relevant to
disease dynamics today.
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FIG. 2. Top: Phase diagrams of epidemic control for R0 = 3,
where the tuning parameters are θ, the rate of asymptomatic
transition, and φ, the fraction of contact-tracing app owner-
ship among the population. RS denotes the basic reproduc-
tion number for pre-symptomatic transmission. Each phase
diagram was generated from 4000 microscopic simulations of
20 generations of disease evolution on 10, 000 nodes, of which
100 nodes were initially infected at random. A black square
denotes epidemic control (average growth in the cumulative
number of infections over the generations 16− 20 is less than
0.25% of total population). This is grayscaled continuously
to white for late-time growth exceeding 2.5% per generation
or full epidemic spread before 20 generations have elapsed.
Dashed red curves denote the mean-field approximation to
the phase boundary, θ = θc(φ) derived in Sec. II C. The exact
critical point for θ = 0 and RS = 2, derived in Appendix A, is
marked by a cyan arrow. Bottom: Sample simulations from
the encircled region in the RS = 0 phase diagram. Curves
(solid) denote cumulative number of infections as a percent-
age of total population, averaged over 10 samples (dashed),
with θ = 0.5 fixed and φ varied from φ = 0.6 to φ = 0.9.
C. Mean-field estimates for the critical line
To understand the connection between our model and
the theory of phase transitions, it it helpful to consider
the limit of no contact tracing, i.e. φ = 0, and no
pre-symptomatic transmission, RS = 0. In this case,
symptomatic individuals act as though they were im-
mune, since they cannot transmit the infection further.
Along the line φ = 0, the model exhibits a transition
from an “immune phase” to an “epidemic phase” for
θ ≥ θc = 1/R0, as shown in Fig. 2. In fact, when φ = 0
and RS = 0, our model maps exactly to site percolation
on a Bethe lattice with coordination number z = 1 +R0,
where “site percolation” is equivalent to the existence of
an infinite cluster of asymptomatic infections. The con-
nection between simple epidemic models and percolation
transitions has been noted in the past [20, 21].
By contrast, the non-local structure of recursive con-
tact tracing, as illustrated in Fig. 1, suggests that the
universality class of the immune-to-epidemic transition
for φ > 0 is distinct from standard site percolation. Nev-
ertheless, in Appendix A we show that for a population
without asymptomatic infections (the line θ = 0 in our
phase diagram), we can obtain the critical fraction φc of
app usage exactly, for general values of R0, such that an
epidemic occurs for φ ≤ φc and is suppressed for φ > φc.
The calculation proceeds by self-consistently estimating
the probability of formation of infinitely long chains of
infections, mirroring the standard techniques of percola-
tion theory [22]. In the presence of a finite fraction of
asymptomatic people (θ 6= 0), we rely on a mean-field
estimate for the location of the critical line (φ, θc(φ)) as
a function of RS ; detailed studies of the exact location
of critical line and the universal features of the contact-
tracing phase transition are left to future work.
To derive a “mean-field” description of our model, let
us label the possible states of an infected individual by
α ∈ {CA,CS,NA,NS}. The probability that an initial
infectious node i is in state α is denoted P(i = α). Ac-
cording to their respective fractions in the population,
we have
P(i = CA) = φθ,
P(i = CS) = φ(1− θ),
P(i = NA) = (1− φ)θ,
P(i = NS) = (1− φ)(1− θ). (2)
Suppose now that the node i = α is infectious at time
t = 0 and adjacent to a susceptible node j. The probabil-
ity of epidemic spread is determined by the probability
of transmission from the node i = α to j and onwards,




P(i = α)P(j = β|i = α), (3)
where P(j = β|i = α) denotes the probability that node
j is infectious and in state β at time t = 1, given that the
node i was in state α at time t = 0, and we make a “mean-
field” approximation whereby only two-node processes
are taken into account. The latter clearly breaks down
when recursive contact tracing is taken into account, a
point that we shall return to below. In terms of these
probabilities pα and the basic reproduction numbers for
the various states Rα, the effective reproduction number
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and the critical line is given by R = 1. Throughout this
section we assume RCA = RNA = R0 and RCS = RNS =
RS .
Let us first consider transmission by individuals off the
contact network. Since such individuals can transmit the
disease freely, we have simply
pNA = (1− φ), pNS = (1− φ)(1− θ). (5)
Moving on to symptomatic individuals on the contact
network (CS), we obtain the following conditional prob-
abilities:
α→ β P(j = β | i = α)
CS → CA 0
CS → CS 0
CS → NA (1− φ)θ
CS → NS (1− φ)(1− θ)
, (6)
which reflects the fact that on-network transmission from
symptomatic individuals cannot generate transmission
beyond node j (c.f. Fig. 1). Then, using Eqs. (2), (3)
and (6), we find
pCS = φ(1− θ)(1− φ). (7)
Finally, we consider asymptomatic infections on the
contact network (CA). While the probabilities of trans-
mitting infection outside the contact network are the
same as Eq. (6), the transmission probabilities within the
contact network are undetermined at the level of mean-
field theory. As a first approximation, we can introduce
variational parameters 0 ≤ γ1, γ2 ≤ 1 which interpolate
between “best” and “worst” cases for epidemic control,
to wit
α→ β P(j = β | i = α)
CA→ CA γ1φθ
CA→ CS γ2φ(1− θ)
CA→ NA (1− φ)θ
CA→ NS (1− φ)(1− θ)
. (8)
In the “best” case, γ1 = γ2 = 0, asymptomatic trans-
mission within the network is completely suppressed, i.e.
P(j = CA | i = CA) = P(j = CS | i = CA) = 0. In the
“worst” case, γ1 = γ2 = 1, asymptomatic transmission
within the network is not suppressed at all, and P(j =
CA | i = CA) = φθ, P(j = CA | i = CS) = φ(1 − θ),
proportional to the population fraction of the respective
states. In these limits, we obtain
pCA =
{
φθ(1− φ), γ1 = γ2 = 0,
φθ, γ1 = γ2 = 1.
(9)
While this provides some useful rules-of-thumb, there is
seemingly no consistent way to fix the variational pa-
rameters γ1 and γ2 within this approach. Since the best
approximation is likely to lie in between these extreme
limits, we consider a näıve linear interpolation and set
pCA(γ) ≡ φθ(γ(1− φ) + (1− γ)), 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1. (10)
We can fix the variational parameter γ self-consistently
by noting that the critical line on the φ − θ phase dia-
gram ought to pass through the point (φ = 1, θ = 1),
since there is an epidemic for {φ < 1, θ = 1}, when the
population is entirely asymptomatic but not entirely on
the contact network, and no epidemic for {φ = 1, θ < 1},
when the population is entirely on the contact network
but not entirely asymptomatic. We find that setting
γ = 1− 1/R0 ensures this condition, and thus obtain the











An alternative approach is to derive a self-consistent
estimate for pCA directly, by explicitly taking into ac-
count some of the higher-order, multi-node processes of
transmission. The key observation is that an infectious
node i = CA can infect a susceptible neighbour j in only
three ways that allow for continued transmission; either
infection is transmitted directly off the contact network,
i → j ∈ {NA,NS}, infection is transmitted off the con-
tact network via a pre-symptomatic, on-network inter-
mediary, i→ j = CS → k ∈ {NA,NS}, or transmission
is perpetuated by another asymptomatic node j ∈ CA
on the contact network. To account for these three pos-




(1− φ) + RS
R0





θφ(1− φ) [R0 +RSφ(1− θ)]
R0(1− θφ)
. (13)
The approximations of Eqs. (5), (7), and (13) then imply







The critical thresholds R = 1 predicted by Eqs. (11)
and (14) are almost indistinguishable on the phase dia-
grams with R0 = 3. In Fig. 2 we show the critical curves
predicted by Eq. (14) and find good agreement with nu-
merical simulations.
These mean-field approaches therefore capture the ap-
proximate location of the critical curve (φ, θc(φ)) (equiv-
alently (φc(θ), θ)), and thus the essential qualitative fea-
tures of recursive contact tracing with non-symptomatic
transmission.
III. DISCUSSION
We have introduced a simple branching-process model
for early-stage epidemic spread, which both retains a
degree of analytical and numerical tractability and is
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sufficiently expressive to model complicated features
of COVID-19 spreading and control, for example pre-
symptomatic transmission, as distinct from asymp-
tomatic transmission, and recursive contact tracing. Us-
ing this model we obtained predictions for realistic
COVID-19 parameter values, finding that in order for a
contact-tracing app to be effective, the fraction of app
take-up among a given population would need to lie
between 75% and 95%, depending on the frequency of
asymptomatic transmission.
We now consider the practical applicability of our re-
sults to India, whose particular challenges provided the
initial stimulus for this work. At first sight, India’s
overall smartphone coverage of around 40% [23] sug-
gests that it might be difficult to attain “digital herd
immunity” using solely app-based contact tracing [11].
However, smartphone-based measures could be combined
with other tracing efforts to compensate for the limited
availability of smartphones. Specifically, more traditional
interview methods can still be used to reconstruct the
location history of a newly diagnosed person. System-
atic, random testing might also help in this regard [24].
As almost 90% [23] of Indians use some sort of wire-
less phone, alerts from people on the app-based network
as well as interview-based alerts could be broadcast via
SMS and combined with cell tower triangulation for spa-
tial resolution in addition to the temporal resolution that
would already be available. Major metropolitan areas,
which include a number of COVID-19 hot-spots [25],
would be particularly well-suited to such a dual approach,
since they exhibit both higher smartphone coverage and
a higher density of cell-phone towers, allowing for more
accurate triangulation [26]. Finally, it seems entirely pos-
sible to boost smartphone ownership for this purpose by
the use of donated used phones and subsidized data pro-
vided to run the contact tracing app.
Several natural questions arise for future work. From
a practical standpoint, one worthwhile extension of our
model would be to allow for a degree of stochasticity
in the basic reproduction number R0, for example, by
simulating the branching-process model on small-world
networks with varying degree per node, which are known
to better reflect realistic human contact networks [27, 28]
than networks with fixed degree. Indeed, network struc-
ture has previously been shown to influence the effec-
tiveness of contact tracing [4, 29–31]. Meanwhile, an
important open problem from the perspective of statisti-
cal physics is pinning down the universality class of the
contact-tracing transition. Our study of the critical point
along the line θ = 0 indicates that techniques from per-
colation theory are likely to be useful; on the other hand,
the non-local character of recursive contact tracing dis-
tinguishes it from the percolation transitions that have
arisen in related applications [20, 21, 32, 33], and sug-
gests that the critical exponents at the transition point
differ from those of standard site percolation, even on the
Bethe lattice. We leave a detailed exploration of these
fascinating questions to subsequent studies.
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Appendix A: Exact critical point for the transition on the θ = 0 axis
In this Appendix, we show how to derive the critical point for the contact-tracing transition along the line θ = 0,
using ideas from percolation theory. Let pN and pC denote the probabilities that an infinite infected cluster is
connected to a node of type N and C respectively. We also write fC and fN for the fraction of the population
respectively on and off the contact network, which, in the notation of the main text, read
fC = φ, fN = (1− φ). (A1)
We start by considering the case when R0 = 2, which means that each infected individual goes on to infect two other
people. The possible R0 = 2 infections generated by an infected individual of type N are N → {N,N}, N → {N,C},
N → {C,N}, and N → {C,C}. For each of these cases, we can write the contribution to the probability pN that the









1− (1− pN )2
)
+ 2fCfN (1− (1− pN )(1− pC)) , (A2)
where the first term on the RHS is the contribution from the process N → {C,C}, the second from N → {N,N}, and
the third from N → {N,C} and N → {C,N}. To understand Eq. (A2), consider the first term, which corresponds
to the process N → {C,C}. It can be obtained in the following way: given an N infection, the probability of the
process N → {C,C}, assuming independent and uniform distribution of individuals on the network, is given by f2C ,
and the probability that at least one subbranch gives rise to an infinite cluster is then given by 1 − (1 − pC)2, since
(1− pC)2 is the probability that neither C generates an infinite cluster. The other terms in Eq. (A2) can be obtained
similarly. Likewise, the possible R0 = 2 infections starting from C are C → {N,N}, C → {N,C} and C → {C,N}.
Note that C → C transmission is suppressed due to contact tracing. Therefore, the probability that a cluster from C
extends to infinity is given by
pC = f
2
N (1− (1− pN )2) + 2fNfC(1− (1− pN )). (A3)
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Solving Eqs. (A2) and (A3) simultaneously, we obtain the critical point φ = φc, such that pN = pC = 0 for φ > φc.
We now illustrate the computation of φc for a general R0 = R. The probabilities pN and pC for this case can be












1− (1− pN )a(1− pC)R−a
)
= (fN + fC)










C (1− (1− pN )
a) = (fN + fC)
R − (fN (1− pN ) + fC)R. (A5)
Substituting Eq. (A5) in Eq. (A4), and using fC + fN = 1, we obtain
pN = 1−
(










































































+ 1 +O(pN ) = 0
=⇒ −RfN (RfC + 1) + 1 +O(pN ) = 0, (A7)
where we have used O(pN ) to denote a polynomial in pN with all terms having degree greater than or equal to 1.
Since the critical fraction φc for a phase transition occurs at pN = 0, we substitute pN = 0, and the fractions fN and
fC in Eq. (A7) to obtain






where we have chosen the physical solution such that 0 ≤ φc ≤ 1. This result matches our numerical phase diagram
to within the resolution of the plot, improving upon the mean-field prediction of the main text; see Fig. 2 for an
example with R = 2.
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